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RECENT CASES
Equal Protection-Gender-Based Discrimination-DEATH BENEFITS TO
SPOUSE OF INSURED DECEASED UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY §402(g) CANNOT BE
LIMITED TO WIDows-Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
Rapidly disintegrating under equal protection attack are many statu-
tory schemes based upon widely held generalizations concerning the
capabilities and needs of women in our society.' These sexual stereo-
types have been reflected in and perpetuated by numerous government
benefit programs,' among them the Social Security Act.3 One social
security provision, section 402(g),' was recently invalidated on equal
1. Compare the philosophies exemplified by Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(upholding the right of the state to establish minimum hours and wages for women despite
the fact that similar legislation regulating men's hours was held unconstitutional); or
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (affirming the right of the state of
Illinois to refuse women admission to the bar):
Man is, or should be, women's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission
of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator.
with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho statute giving preference to
men in the administration of an intestate's estate); and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973) (invalidating a statute requiring that servicewomen prove spousal depend-
ency as a prerequisite to receiving benefits while imposing no such burden on servicemen).
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an
attitude of "romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage.
2. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See note 32 and accompany-
ing text infra. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding a California insurance
program excluding maternity benefits). Numerous unemployment benefit programs such
as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 420(c)(4) (1973) along with 28 other jurisdictions automatically
exclude pregnant women regardless of their ability to work. Walker, Sex Discrimination
in Government Benefit Programs, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 277, 278 (1972).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), which provides:
Mother's Insurance Benefits
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother. . . of an individual, if such
widow or surviving divorced mother
(A) is not married,
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit,
(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-
age insurance benefits each of which is less than three-fourths of the
primary insurance amount of such individual,
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or was enti-
tled to wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-
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protection grounds by the United States Supreme Court in Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, illustrating that generalizations regarding spousal de-
pendency, which ultimately prove detrimental to women, will no longer
justify gender-based distinctions in legislation.
The purpose of this case note is to examine the extent to which
Wiesenfeld represents a metamorphosis of existing equal protection
standards. At least two notable departures from previous decisions deal-
ing with gender-based classifications may be observed. In contrast to its
traditional deference to the government's assertion of legislative pur-
pose, the Court critically examined and ultimately rejected the asserted
purpose. Previously, the Court focused primarily upon the rationality of
the purpose asserted by the government rather than questioning
whether that purpose was genuine. Inasmuch as the remedial purpose
rejected by the Court was identical to that upheld in Kahn v. Shevin,
Wiesenfeld indicates that use of a remedial purpose as justification will
not be expanded beyond circumstances similar to those in Kahn. Fur-
thermore, the silence of the Court as to the nature of the classification
evidently marks a retreat on the part of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
White from their position that gender-based classifications are constitu-
tional suspect.
Stephen Wiesenfeld was left with the sole care of his infant son upon
the death of his wife. She had been the principle source of the couple's
income7 and had contributed maximum social security deductions for
seven years prior to her death.' Wiesenfeld applied for and received
social security survivor's benefits for his son' but was denied such bene-
employment income of such individual for the month preceeding the
month in which he died,
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child of
such individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit ... shall...
be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit....
(2) Such mother's insurance benefit for each month shall be equal to three-
fourths of the primary insurance amount of such individual....
5. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
6. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
7. As the Court noted:
In 1970, Paula earned $9,808, and Stephen earned $3,100 as a self-employed
consultant; in 1971, Paula earned $10,686 and Stephen $2,188; in 1972, Paula
earned $6,836.35 before she died, and Stephen $2,475 for the entire year. Ste-
phen completed his education before the marriage.
420 U.S. at 639 n. 4.
8. Id. at 639. In making those social security contributions the deceased wife was "fully
insured" for purposes of section 402(g). Had she been a male, her spouse would have been
entitled to the survivor's benefits. See id. at 639 n.3.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970) provides survivor's benefits for children of eligible employ-
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fits for himself as they were available under section 402(g) only to wid-
ows.0
Wiesenfeld filed suit before a three-judge federal district court in New
Jersey," contending that this social security scheme, allowing survivor's
benefits to only widows, violated his right to equal protection' 2 guaran-
teed by the fifth amendment.'3 Applying traditional two-tiered equal
protection standard,'4 the court found in favor of the Plaintiff. It
asserted that sex-based classifications were inherently suspect'" and,
10. See note 4, supra.
11. Wiesenfeld filed suit seeking: (1) a declaration that section 402(g) is unconstitu-
tional in that similarly situated men and women were treated differently; (2) an injunction
restraining appellant from denying benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) on the basis of sex;
and (3) payments of past benefits commencing with the date of application. 420 U.S. at
641-42.
12. It should be noted that the Plaintiff Wiesenfeld, a male, was allowed to assert the
rights of his deceased wife Paula in addition to his own. It appears to be settled that an
individual need not be a member of the excluded class in order to assert the constitution-
ally protected rights of said class. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (in which
a male convicted by a jury composed solely of males was allowed to assert the exclusion
of women from jury service as a violation of equal protection).
13. It appears well settled that the due process clause of the fifth amendment includes
the identical equal protection guarantee found in the fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion clause. As noted in Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 638 n.2:
[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does
forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due pro-
cess.' ". .. This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims
has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment (citations omitted).
14. The three judge district court in Wiesenfeld described the traditional two-tiered
equal protection analysis as follows:
The Supreme Court has utilized two equal protection tests. If a statute is based
upon an "inherently suspect" classification such as race, alienage, or national
origin, or it concerns a "fundamental interest". . it is subject to strict or "close
judicial scrutiny" and will be held invalid in the absence of a countervailing
"compelling" governmental interest. In all other circumstances, under the "tra-
ditional" equal protection standard, a legislative classification must be upheld
unless it is "patently arbitrary" and bears no "rational relationship" to a legiti-
mate governmental interest.
367 F.Supp. 981, 987 (1973).
15. Id. at 990-91. Having affirmed the two-tiered concept of equal protection, the court
was faced with the dilemma of choosing the standard applicable to gender-based classifi-
cations, a decision complicated by the Supreme Court's ambiguous position on the issue.
While recognizing that only a plurality of the Supreme Court have viewed sex-based
classifications as suspect, the district court was nonetheless pursuaded by the argument
espoused by Justice Brennan in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) to apply close
judicial scrutiny. Examples of suspect classifications include race, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and national
origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
[Vol. 25:210
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finding no countervailing compelling interest to justify the classifica-
tion, concluded that section 402(g) of the Social Security Act effected
an impermissible discrimination against working women."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision."
However, the Court completely disregarded the district court rationale,
and instead ostensibly applied the rational relationship test.'" Although
this test has traditionally entailed the application of minimal scrutiny,
the Court in Wiesenfeld expressly rejected the purpose proffered by the
government in favor of its own determination of purpose.
The government attempted to justify the classification on the basis
of its being designed to alleviate the effects of past gender-based dis-
crimination.' 9 In response to this assertion of a remedial legislative pur-
pose, undoubtedly reflecting an attempt to characterize the legislation
in a manner such that it might be upheld under Kahn v. Shevin,25 the
Court observed:
the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an auto-
matic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual pur-
poses underlying a statutory scheme ...
This Court need not in equal protection analysis accept at face value
assertions of legislative purposes when an examination of the legislative
scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could
not have been a goal of the legislation."
16. 367 F. Supp. at 991.
17. 420 U.S. at 653.
18. The language utilized by the Court in Wiesenfeld indicates that it is ultimately
determining whether the social security scheme at issue is rationally related to the legisla-
tive purpose. "Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent to remain at home to
care for a child, the gender based distinction of § 402(g) is entirely irrational." 420 U.S.
at 653. However, the Court's decision to invalidate section 402(g) indicates that a closer
form of scrutiny was used.
19. The government seeks to characterize the classification here as one rea-
sonably designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the eco-
nomic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support themselves
and their families.
420 U.S. at 648.
The Government also attempted to justify the classification on the grounds that section
402(g) benefits were non-contractual, and therefore due process guarantees were not in-
volved. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1970). The Supreme Court summarily
rejected this argument. It observed that social security benefits are traditionally awarded
as a matter of right to a covered employee.
20. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (allowing property tax exemptions to widows and upheld by the
Supreme Court as being rationally designed to alleviate the effects of past discrimination
against women).
21. 420 U.S. at 648 & n.16:
1975]
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It concluded that the actual legislative purpose was to enable the surviv-
ing parent to remain at home to care for the dependent children.22 A
critical examination of the statutory scheme resulted in the determina-
tion that section 402(g) was wholly irrational with respect to this pur-
pose. z3
The Court's decision and rationale suggest that the Court is here
departing from the traditional two-tier analysis in favor of a new form
of intermediate level of review. In contrast to its traditional deference
to legislative purpose in such cases, the Court critically examined the
purpose asserted by the Government, ultimately rejecting it.2 It is this
result, attained through the Court's intensive analysis of the asserted
legislative purpose, rather than the presence of any significant language,
which implicitly indicates, that closer scrutiny was used.2"
The requirement of a rational legislative purpose is by no means an
innovation." However, the Court's preliminary scrutiny of the validity
22. Id. at 648-49, 651.
23. Id. at 651.
24. In Kahn where the court used the rational relation test, it did not require that the
state prove that alleviating the effects of past economic discrimination was the actual
purpose of the Florida statute. Rather, it accepted at face value statistical data concerning
the disparities between the earning of males and females as proof that the asserted reme-
dial purpose was the actual legislative purpose and that this purpose was furthered. This
purpose, however, was only marginally consistant with the statutory scheme, as supported
by the empirical data.
The statistics cited by the Court may establish that many women are underpaid
but they demonstrate nothing about the relative economic needs of widows vis-
a-vis widowers. . . . The Court's statistics bear more closely on the plight of
single women than of widows but the former class are excluded from the exemp-
tion by definition. The exemption also fails to benefit widows with no property,
arguably the class in most need of economic relief.
Note, 88 HARV. L. REv. 129, 132 n. 29 (1974).
25. Had the Court, in Kahn, applied closer scrutiny, the obvious inconsistencies in that
case would have perhaps proven fatal in the absence of a compelling state interest. Thus,
closer scrutiny such as that demonstrated in Wiesenfeld would perhaps have resulted in
a finding of unconstitutionality. Similarly, had the Court in Wiesenfeld accepted the
legislative purpose asserted by the Government, it would most probably have upheld the
legislation since the generalizations upon which the scheme was premised could have been
supported by statistical data, similar to that adduced in Kahn.
26. The Court has declared unconstitutional many legislative schemes in which the
purposes were rationally related to the challenged legislation, and yet the Court did not
identify the interests as "fundamental" or the classification as "suspect." Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a sex-based classification creating a preference for males
over females in the administration of intestate estates); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating a statute discriminating between acknowledged and
unacknowledged illegitimates in the distribution of workmen's compensation benefits);
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (finding unconstitutional a Kansas provision for
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of the legislative purposes, coupled with a realistic review of its relation
to the disputed legislation, resulted in the imposition of a closer stan-
dard of review than would have been afforded by the utilization of this
intermediate, ends/means analysis. The latter form of analysis charac-
teristically requires that legislative means substantively further legisla-
tive ends and that those ends be constitutionally permissible.27 For ex-
ample, Reed v. Reed" involved scrutiny of the means utilized in further-
ing the interest of the state in simplifying its probate proceedings.2
Wiesenfeld also marks an apparent departure by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and White from their position that sex-based classifications
are inherently suspect. While a majority of the Supreme Court has never
declared sex a suspect classification, at least four Justices have so stated
in Frontiero v. Richardson,"° observing the parallels between sexual and
racial discrimination.2 In Frontiero, the Supreme Court overturned fed-
the recoupment of legal fees expended. by the state on behalf of indigent defendants). All
three statutes could be rationally justified as a reasonable simplification of administrative
proceedings. Such decisions have led many commentators to conclude that an intermedi-
ate level of review has been utilized in some cases. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model For a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Getman, The Emerging Constitu-
tional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 157; Nowak, Realigning the Stan-
dards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee: Prohibited, Neutral and Permis-
sive Classification, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Note, 87 HAav. L. REV. 121 (1973); see, e.g.,
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. This intermediate, or ends/means, analysis has been described by various legal
scholars in subtle different ways, primarily to conform the Court's decisions to their
particular models of equal protection. One view suggests that the Court employed a
"means" analysis to put "consistent new bite into the old equal protection." Gunther,
supra note 26, at 21. Another argues the ends/means test requires that actual proof be
adduced that the legislative end is furthered. Note, 87 HARv. L. REV. supra note 26, at
124. Finally, Nowak utilizes the ends/means test in an attempt to align the past decade
of equal protection decisions into a tripartite system of prohibited, neutral, and permissive
classifications. Nowak, supra note 26, at 1071-81.
28. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29. The Court concluded that male preference was not rationally related to such an end.
Id. at 71-77. The Court in Reed did not question whether the purpose espoused by the
state was the actual intent of the legislature. Had the Wiesenfeld Court not looked for
and discovered a legislative purpose different from that asserted, it would have perhaps
been forced to sustain the challenged provision even if the Court used traditional
ends/means analysis. Otherwise, the Court would have been faced with the difficult task
of justifying the overturning of a statutory scheme which was prima facie reasonable.
30. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
31. [Tlhroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil
War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
bring suit in their own names.
Id. at 685.
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eral legislation based upon a presumption similar to section 402(g) of the
Social Security Act."' In that decision, Justice Brennan, writing for only
a plurality, stated that classifications based upon gender, like those
based upon race, alienage or national origin, are inherently suspect. :':,
Paradoxically, Brennan's decision in Wiesenfeld invoked Frontiero to
support its invalidation of section 402(g), arguing that the disputed
provision was based on an obsolete and overbroad generalization "indis-
tinguishable from that invalidated in Frontiero," that wives are finan-
cially dependent upon their husbands." Yet, the Wiesenfeld Court sur-
prisingly ignored the issue essential to the Frontiero decision: is sex a
suspect classification? The Court's silence appears even more startling
in light of the lower court's total reliance upon Justice Brennan's
Frontiero opinion in reaching its decision."
The Supreme Court's refusal to address important issues in
Wiesenfeld primarily reflects judicial restraint; apparently, the Court is
reluctant to intrude into an area foreshadowed by the controversy over
the Equal Rights Amendment." It is understandable, therefore, that the
Court tempered its strict review of legislative purpose with a refusal to
declare sex a suspect classification.
Although no clear standard had been articulated, a current trend
toward closer review of sex-based classifications appears to be emerging.
Regardless of the precise rationale underlying the Wiesenfeld decision,
it is of significant precedential impact that eight members of the Court
held section 402(g) invalid. One can conclude that gender-based dis-
crimination in the distribution of governmental benefits will most likely
continue to be held unconstitutional. While the test currently utilized
does not guarantee such a result, 37 it is unlikely that gender-based classi-
fications which prove harmful to women could withstand the scrutiny
exemplified in Wiesenfeld.
Unfortunately, the Wiesenfeld decision also has serious negative im-
32. Id. at 679-80. 37 U.S.C. § 403 (1970) provided benefits to dependents of members
of the uniformed services. However, while the wife of any serviceman was labeled a
dependent, the husband of a servicewoman was considered a dependent only if he was,
in fact, dependent upon his wife for over one-half of his support.
33. Id. at 688.
34. 420 U.S. at 642-45.
35. See note 15, supra.
36. At the time of this writing thirty-four states have passed the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Four more states must
ratify it before the 1979 deadline.
37. Gunther, note 26 supra, at 8, notes that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory and fatal
in fact."
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plications. While the tactics employed in Wiesenfeld to review gender-
based legislative classifications allow greater flexibility in reviewing
equal protection challenges in varying factual contexts, they can only
promote conflicting lower court decisions. Furthermore, the vesting of
so great an amount of discretion in the judicial branch subjects the
Wiesenfeld standard to potential abuse. As legitimate legislative pur-
poses may be arbitrarily set aside, the precedent set by Wiesenfeld is
truly a double-edged sword.
Florence Baum Schechtman
Criminal Procedure-Competency-USE OF PRESCRIBED MEDICATIONS
TO MAINTAIN MENTAL CAPABILITIES RENDERS A DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL-People v. Dalfonso, 24 ILL. APP. 3d 748, 321 N.E.2d 379
(1st Dist. 1974).
In People v. Dalfonso,' the Illinois Appellate Court for the First Dis-
trict held that a criminal defendant whose mental capabilities are main-
tained through the use of prescribed medications is competent for trial.2
This was a case of first impression for Illinois. Adopting the analysis
used in several other jurisdictions, 3 the court looked solely to the present
condition of the defendant and his fitness to stand trial.' In order to
appreciate the impact of this recent case, this Casenote will examine the
purposes of the competency rule.5
1. 24 Ill.App.3d 748, 321 N.E.2d 379 (1st Dist. 1974).
2. Id. at 750-51, 321 N.E.2d at 381.
3. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text infra.
4. 24 Ill.App.3d at 751, 321 N.E.2d at 382.
5. In Illinois, competency is defined in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §1005-2-1(a) (1973):
(a) For the purposes of this Section a defendant is unfit to stand trial or be
sentenced if, because of a mental or physical condition, he is unable:
(1) to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against
him; or
(2) to assist in his defense.
The statute now uses the term "fitness" rather than "competency to further clarify its
intent." This use of terminology also makes explicit the fact that either mental or physical
defects may render a defendant unfit for trial. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1, Council
Commentary (Smith-Hurd 1973). Considering the widespread use of the word "compe-
tency" in the cases and commentaries, and because "competency" is the correct term
when referring to a mental defect, the term will be used throughout this Casenote, unless
reference is made to specific terms of the statute.
For an examination of statutes from other states and a comparison of their scope see
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, Table 11-2, at 444-53
(S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).
